It still lacked radar-guided air-to-air weapons, forgoing them in favor of the heat-seeking Sidewinder missile. "Gold-plating," in their minds, including a number of things we now think of as practically standard in a fourth- or fifth-generation fighter, like fire control radar, electronic countermeasures for flying in highly contested airspace, radar-guided missiles, and - perhaps most importantly - ground-attack capabilities.īy the time the F-16A began to emerge, it would have some of that gold-plating the "Lightweight Fighter Mafia" so disdained, like an AN/APG-66 radar and some intrinsic ground-attack capabilities. Its designers at General Dynamics, internally known as the "Lightweight Fighter Mafia," sought to keep the "gold-plating" they believed common in new fighter programs away from their new jet. In fact, as the Navy mulled over the idea of converting the F-16 for carrier use, it once again found stiff competition in the form of Northrop's YF-17. Ultimately, the YF-16 would outperform the Northrop's YF-17 in testing oriented specifically toward the Air Force's needs, but it wouldn't be the last time these two highly capable platforms would find themselves competing over a contract. In the minds of military leaders, the large, powerful, and expensive F-15 brought more power to bear than was really necessary for many combat operations, and as such, a cheaper but still highly capable jet could complement America's fleet of Eagles by assuming those lower stakes roles. The YF-17 was a lightweight prototype fighter first designed to serve as a lower-cost alternative to America's most dominant air superiority fighter in the modern era, the F-15 Eagle. In order for the YF-16 to find its destiny as the Air Force's workhorse fighter, it first had to contend with stiff competition in the form of Northrop's YF-17. The F-16, then, could have become a similar boondoggle (or maybe proven the concept sound) if the Vought Model 1600, or carrier-capable F-16, had ever made it into service. This line of thinking, of course, would eventually lead to the acquisition nightmare that has been the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which was also intended to be a single fighter platform that could meet the disparate needs of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as foreign buyers. The F-16 had performed well in its pursuit of the Air Force contract, and if the Navy could also find use for the Fighting Falcon, Schlesinger reasoned, the Defense Department could procure the jet in higher numbers and streamline logistics for both branches. Shortly after the F-16 won the Air Force's new Air Combat Fighter (ACF) contract in 1975, then-Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger pushed the US Navy to adopt the new fighter as well. A US Air Force pilot in an F-16 at McEntire Joint National Guard Base in South Carolina, April 12, 2008.